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Abstrakt  
Artykuł podejmuje problematykę zależności państw subregionu Zatoki Perskiej od do-
chodów z eksportu węglowodorów i analizuje ją z perspektywy teorii regionalnych komplek-
sów bezpieczeństwa (TRKB). Hipoteza badawcza zakłada, że zależność od eksportu węglo-
wodorów jest jednym istotnych czynników pogłębiających dylemat bezpieczeństwa w tym 
subregionie. Artykuł charakteryzuje główne zależności w obszarze bezpieczeństwa pomiędzy 
państwami Zatoki Perskiej, analizuje stopień i skutki uzależnienia poszczególnych państw od 
eksportu ropy naftowej i gazu ziemnego oraz przedstawia działania ich rządy, mające na celu 
uniknięcie popadnięcia w zależność klątwy surowcowej. Wykorzystywana w artykule TRKB 
pozwala na ukazanie, w jaki sposób zależność od eksportu gazu i ropy naftowej podsyca 
regionalne konflikty, utrudnia bliższą współpracę i w ten sposób utrwala nieefektywny 
i zasobochłonny model gospodarki rozdzielczej, opartej na dochodach zewnętrznych.  
Słowa kluczowe: TRKB, Zatoka Perska, eksport węglowodorów, zależność, dyle-
mat bezpieczeństwa 
Introduction 
The aim of the article is to investigate the problem of dependence 
of the Gulf countries on hydrocarbon export in the perspective of the 
regional security complex theory (RSCT). The assumed research 
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hypothesis is structured as follows: the dependence on hydrocarbons 
export is one of the important factors that deepen the security dilemma in 
the Gulf. The article starts with delineating the features of the Gulf 
subregion, which will be followed by the analysis of the degree and effects 
of dependence on hydrocarbons export for the region's states. Some of them, 
aware of the problem caused by such a dependence have undertaken 
attempts to escape the pitfall of resource course with varying success. The 
RSCT perspective will be used consistently throughout the article to show 
how the reliance on gas and oil exports exacerbates regional conflicts, 
prevents closer cooperation and thus petrifies the inefficient and resource 
costly model of the distributive economy based on the external rent.  
Regional security subcomplex of the Gulf 
In the regional security complex theory (RSCT) the Gulf is one of 
three subcomplexes of the Middle Eastern regional security complex. 
The Middle Eastern regional security complex is described as a perennial 
conflict formation, in which the autonomous regional level of security is 
intertwined with strong external influences from the global level (Buzan, 
Waever 2003: 187). The borders of the region include all Arab states 
plus Iran and Israel. Afghanistan and Turkey play the role of isolators 
between the Middle East and the regions of South Asia and Europe re-
spectively. Middle Easter RSC is then divided into three subcomplexes: 
Maghreb, which includes the Arab states of North Africa, such as Alge-
ria, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia; the Levant, which includes Egypt, Isra-
el along with the Occupied Palestinian Territories, Jordan, Lebanon and 
Syria; Persian Gulf, which consists of Iran, Iraq, and all countries lying 
on the Arabian Peninsula, namely Bahrain, Yemen, Qatar, Kuwait, 
Oman, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates (Buzan, Waever 2003: 
187–191). 
For decades the Gulf subcomplex has been "centered on a triangular 
rivalry among Iran, Iraq, and the Gulf Arab states led by Saudi Arabia" 
(Buzan, Waever 2003: 191). After 2003, however, when Iraq fell into 
chaos after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein and ceased to play a role 
of regional power, the subcomplex is centered on a two-sided rivalry 
between Iran and Saudi Arabia. In addition to this, there is a number of 
peripheral rivalries: inside Yemen (which became a proxy conflict of the 
Saudi-Iranian rivalry) and more recently between Qatar and Saudi Ara-
bia. The Saudi-Iranian rivalry stemmed from both the traditional patterns 
of amity and enmity as well as from more recent political and economic 
interest and ambitions. Both parties to claim leadership of opposing sides 
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in the traditional Middle Eastern rivalries: Sunni-Shiite and Arab-
Persian. In the XXI century, this sectarianism has been consequently 
securitized by both sides, becoming a defining regional cleavage. As 
Saudi Arabia and Iran are the most powerful countries located on the 
Gulf, they naturally compete with each other for influence in other states 
of the subregion and for control over the Persian Gulf itself and sea 
transport routes running there. Saudi Arabia has gained a much stronger 
position in the smaller states of the subregion: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, 
and the UAE, while Iran consistently strengthens its influence in Iraq 
and recently also in Qatar. The Saudi-Iranian rivalry is also partially 
a result of "a diversionary tactic of domestically vulnerable Gulf monar-
chies to divert attention away from their democratic and economic short-
comings" (Hanau Santini R. 2017: 103). The same can be said about 
Iranian authorities, which securitize the external relations of the country 
in an attempt to divert the attention of their own society from unresolved 
internal problems. 
Iran's actions are of course a certain objective threat to Saudi Ara-
bia's national security, especially in the context of supporting and incit-
ing local Shi'ite communities and threats to block shipping routes in the 
waters of the Persian Gulf. However, it is hard to imagine that Iran could 
pose an existential threat to Saudi Arabia, especially if we take into ac-
count the security guarantees that the United States give to the govern-
ment in Riyadh. She scale of securitization of threats from Iran and the 
Shiite community allows even to talk about the anti-Shiite paranoia of 
the authorities in Riyadh, bolstered to a large extent by the Wahhabi 
religious-political doctrine. It takes the form of fear of tightening around 
Saudi Arabia, the "Shiite ring", which would surround it from the south 
(Yemeni Zaidis), the east (Iran and the Shiite minority in the east of 
Saudi Arabia) and the north (Iraqi Shiites and Alawites in Syria) 
(Shihabi 2018, Coogle 2017). 
The degree and effects of dependence  
on hydrocarbons export  
For decades of oil and gas extraction and export, the economies of 
the Gulf countries have become deeply dependent on this source of 
income. This is perfectly illustrated by the percentage of fiscal revenues, 
which in individual countries come from the hydrocarbons export. 
Between 2011 and 2014 it was over 90% in Iraq, approx. 80% in Saudi 
Arabia and Kuwait, 70% in Bahrain, Qatar, and Yemen, 50% in Iran, 
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45% in Oman and 40% in UAE (Economic Diversification..., 2016: 8; 
US Energy Information Administration). Since the oil crisis in early 
1970. the Gulf countries used the rising oil and gas export revenues to 
develop the model distributive economy. Using their privileged financial 
situation, these countries imported technologies, knowledge, and labor, 
developing not through their own invention or innovation but through 
imitation and learning (Hvidt 2015: 24-25). This model, however, turned 
out to be problematic, causing the enormous dependence on the export of 
energy resources on the one hand and on the import of knowledge and 
technology on the other. The distributive economy was also unable to 
create a sufficient number of jobs for the local population in non-oil 
sectors or to meet the other needs of citizens of the Gulf states. The Gulf 
countries have failed in ensuring an equitable distribution of income and 
government expenditures were often wasteful (Askari and Arfaa 2007: 
177–202). 
The economy of Saudi Arabia, the biggest in the region, is 
significantly dependent on hydrocarbons export. Oil, gas and oil 
products represent ca. 80% of fiscal revenues and 90% of total export 
revenues, as well as account for 45% of the country's GDP. Saudi Arabia 
has the second largest oil resources in the world, estimated at ca. 266 
billion barrels and in 2016 produced ca. 10,5 million barrels of oil per 
day (Saudi Arabia Facts...). The economy of Saudi Arabia, giving 
employment to over 10 million foreigners (Saudi Arabia, CIA Factbook), 
is also struggling with the problem of high unemployment among its 
own citizens, especially poorly educated young Saudis. This supposed to 
be changed by the complex program of socio-economic reforms, Vision 
2030, announced in April 2016 (Vision 2030). It is still too early to 
prejudge the chances of this program's success, however, it seems that 
the economic problems of Saudi Arabia are to a large extent structural. 
They are partly caused by the cultural limitations of the Saudis 
themselves, resulting from their Bedouin-tribal traditions, and partly by 
the government's policy of social distribution, which discourages young 
citizens from making efforts to increase their knowledge or improve 
their skills to become competitive on the labor market. Obviously, the 
purely economic factor, that is replacing local workers with much 
cheaper employees from abroad, also plays a huge role here (Sons 2018: 
125-143; El-Katiri 2016). 
Iran, the second-biggest economy among the Gulf countries, in 
addition to oil and gas production (proven crude oil reserves of 157,200 
million barrels and proven natural gas reserves of 33,721.2 billion cu. 
m.) has also a fairly well-developed agriculture, industry, and service 
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sector. The country struggles, however, with numerous economic pro-
blems and its own limitations, which significantly hinder its economic 
development. These include international economic sanctions, largely 
abolished in January 2016 as a result of the implementation of the 
JCPOA nuclear deal, but partially restored in May 2018 after the US 
president, Donald Trump decided to withdraw the US from the agre-
ement (The JCPOA Timeline....). No less important are also the internal 
factors, such as huge state interference in the economy, ubiquitous 
corruption, inflation, high unemployment, price control, subsidizing 
unprofitable projects and weak banking system (Eltejaei 2015; Jalilvand 
D. R. 2018: 95-105). 
The war-shattered economy of Iraq is particularly heavily dependent 
on the revenues from oil export. Its proven crude oil reserves of 148,766 
million barrels represent over 90% of the country's fiscal revenues and 
almost 100% of the value of its exports. The Iraqi economy has been hit 
hard by recent conflict with self-proclaimed Iraq and Levant State (ISIS), 
ongoing disputes with the authorities of the Iraqi Kurdistan Autonomous 
Region and numerous pathologies of political and economic life, such as 
bad governance, endemic corruption, nepotism, mismanagement, etc. 
(Al-Khatteeb 2018: 106-124).  
The United Arab Emirates, unlike most other Gulf countries, 
achieved considerable success in diversifying their economy. This was 
possible mainly due to investments in infrastructure, promotion of the 
market economy and private enterprise as well as incentives for foreign 
investors from non-oil sectors. The main problems of the Emirates' 
economies are still significant dependence on oil inflows, huge 
dependence on the foreign labor force and growing inflationary pressure 
(El-Katiri 2018: 82-94). The Qatari authorities followed the same path 
and although sales of crude oil and natural gas continue to be the main 
sources of income, the country has also made significant investments in 
non-energy sectors, in particular processing, construction, and financial 
services. The attempts to diversify the Kuwaiti economy have been less 
successful. The authorities were not able to stimulate the private sector, 
nor to create a good climate for foreign investment in non-oil-producing 
sectors. The reserves of this resource in Kuwait are huge and reach 
101,500 million barrels (6% of global reserves), but also account for 
80% of budget revenues, 90% of total exports and half of the country's 
GDP (Kuwait facts and figures). 
Oil resources in Oman are slowly depleting and the country must use 
more and more advanced (and therefore more expensive) mining 
techniques to maintain its production level. Sultanate authorities have 
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adopted an ambitious plan to limit the oil sector's share in the country's 
GDP from 46% to 9% by 2020 through investments in tourism and gas-
based industries, but the success of this plan seems unlikely. The 
economic situation of Bahrain is even worse, as the excessively large 
social expenditures and employment in the public sector have exceeded 
the country's financial capabilities for a long time. The own oil resources 
of this island kingdom began to run out already in 1970. and now it can 
supply its own refineries with crude oil and export oil products only 
thanks to Saudi Arabia agreeing to make additional shares available to 
them in their joint Abu Saafa deposit (Cordesman, al-Rodhan 2007: 65). 
In April 2018 the Bahraini authorities have announced the discovery of 
huge oil and gas deposits that may contain up to 80 billion barrels of oil 
and 390 billion cu. m. of natural gas. The oil and gas resources are, 
however, held in source-rock formations (shale deposits) and it remains 
unknown how much of it is at all recoverable (Noel 2018). Any attempts 
to diversify the Bahraini economy did not bring the desired results so far. 
Additionally, both Oman and Bahrain, for a long time have had problems 
balancing their budgets, so at the moment they already have a high 
public debt and no significant financial reserves (El-Katiri 2018: 82-94). 
Yemen, the poorest country in the Arabian Peninsula, has much fewer oil 
reserves than other countries in the region. Despite this, revenues from 
its exports still represent 1/4 of its GDP and over 65% of budget 
revenues. At least that was so until the overthrow of President Salah and 
the outbreak of the civil war that caused the country's further economic 
downturn. In the face of ongoing conflict, the perspectives of the Yemeni 
economy look very bad and the situation of the majority of the 
population of the country is dramatic (Feierstein 2018). 
The sharp drop in oil prices recorded since 2014 has seriously 
affected the economies of the Persian Gulf countries. To balance their 
budgets for the years coming many of them had to use their foreign 
currency reserves, issue bonds and cut selected expenses. In the second 
quarter of 2016, crude oil prices bounced back from their record low 26 
USD per barrel in February 2016 and began to grow, reaching 80 USD 
per barrel in mid-May 2018 (Geiger 2018). The fall in oil prices since 
2014 have been caused by several factors: smaller demand due to the 
generally poor global economic situation, increasing efficiency of the 
industry and growing substitution of oil by other energy sources; 
prolonged lack of agreement among producers to reduce extraction; 
growing production of shale oil in the USA (Why the Oil Price is 
Falling). Furthermore, an agreement on the Iranian nuclear program in 
July 2015 (JCPOA) and lifting the economic sanctions imposed earlier, 
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resulted in increased crude oil export from that country. In 2016, the 
International Energy Agency (IEA) believed that the drop in the price of 
oil is long-term and will not stabilize at a level close to 80 USD per 
barrel at least until 2020 (World Energy Outlook).  
In the search for alternative solutions 
The crisis associated with the fall in oil prices in the years 2014-
2017 shows the fragility of an adopted economic model and raises the 
question of how to deal with this type of sudden drop in income. If the 
Gulf countries decide to cut subsidies, investment expenditures and other 
government programs, it will certainly have a negative impact on the 
social mood and internal stability of these countries. Societies 
accustomed to receiving numerous goods and services for free or at very 
preferential prices will not favor the power that takes them away from 
them. An attempt to strengthen the income side of the budget, for 
example by raising (and in some countries introducing) taxes, would 
certainly provoke similar, angry responses from the public. Meanwhile, 
the break-even oil prices (oil prices necessary to balance the budget, 
without limiting public spending) in 2016 were: 106 USD per barrel for 
Bahrain, 97 for Saudi Arabia, 89 for Oman, 61 for UAE, 58 for Iran, 50 
for Qatar, 47 for Iraq, and 43 for Kuwait (Oct 2017 MCD REO...).  
The steps taken by the leaders of the Gulf states in 2014 and 2015 to 
reduce the budget deficits, shown they are aware of this problem. In Saudi 
Arabia, in 2015 the budget deficit amounted to around 20% of GDP, the 
authorities in the first place decided to finance it from foreign exchange 
reserves and by borrowing money. However, without reducing expenditures 
and finding other sources of income, even huge foreign currency reserves of 
Saudi Arabia would be enough to balance the budget for only several years. 
Therefore Saudi authorities had to plan some expenditure reductions that, 
according to the government, would affect mainly various investment 
projects that are not crucial for the state economy. The military and social 
expenditure supposed to remain mostly intact (Saudi Arabia to run out...). 
These plans, however, proved to be unrealistic and ultimately Saudi Arabia 
had to significantly reduce its military and, to some extent, social spending 
in 2016 (The Military Balance 2017: 401). 
Even more difficult was the situation of Bahrain, which in 2015 
recorded a budget deficit of USD 4 billion, which accounted for around 
13% of its GDP. Because the kingdom did not have any significant 
foreign currency reserves and its bonds had a "junk" rating in order to 
save public finances, the Bahraini authorities had to cut down on some 
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social expenses and benefits, including subsidies for water, electricity, fuels, 
meat and poultry (Bahrain, Oman cut....). The situation of Oman was 
equally difficult because its budget deficit in 2015 amounted to USD 6.5 
billion, which accounted for 11% of its GDP. Just like Bahrain, Oman had 
limited possibilities to finance the deficit from reserves or loans, so the 
sultanate's authorities tried to cut social expenditures, which met with strong 
resistance from society (Al Kharusi, Stella Ada 2018: 1141–1157).  
In Iraq, low oil prices caused problems with balancing the budget and 
significantly hinder the reconstruction of the areas previously occupied by 
ISIS and destroyed as a result of the fighting. In Yemen, low oil prices 
combined with the ongoing civil war led to an uncontrolled rise in 
inflation and a significant reduction in food and fuel imports, which 
caused a humanitarian crisis in many regions of the country. Low oil 
prices were also a problem for Iran, which, after the abolition of economic 
sanctions in early 2016, planned to use higher profits from the sale of oil 
and gas to rebuild its economy and increase investment. Iran, however, 
according to its officials, prefers a "reasonable" oil price, which should 
oscillate around 60–70 USD per barrel (Iran oil min says...). 
Other Gulf states are in a relatively better situation. The United Arab 
Emirates have taken some steps to reduce social spending, but the 
country anyway has sufficiently large foreign currency reserves to 
survive for decades of low oil prices. Similarly, Qatar and Kuwait, 
which, although affected by declines in oil prices, have managed to 
accumulate sufficiently large financial reserves over the past decades to 
balance their budgets in the long run. It is estimated that Kuwait and 
Qatar could survive for 25 years with oil prices below 50 USD a barrel, 
and UAE even 30 years (Saudi Arabia to run out...). 
In the face of unstable revenues from the export of hydrocarbons, 
one of the areas of the Gulf states' public spending, which is military 
expenditure, becomes particularly important. Military expenditures 
represent a significant burden on the budgets of most Gulf countries, 
accounting for a large share of government spending (in 2017 it was 
11,8% in Bahrain, 15,8% in Iran, 9,4% in Iraq, 11,3% in Kuwait, 26,3% 
in Oman, 30,4% in Saudi Arabia (SIPRI Military Expenditure Database 
2018) 1). A possible reduction of these expenditures would not be 
associated with such serious social dissatisfaction as limiting social 
spending, but countries of the Gulf are not very eager to limit these 
expenses. This is mainly due to the fact that the authorities perceive the 
reinforcement and expansion of the armed forces as a response to the 
                            
1 Reliable, recent data on Qatar, UAE and Yemen are unavailable, but they are like-
ly high-spending countries (SIPRI Military Expenditure Database 2018). 
The dependence of gulf countries on hydrocarbons export...  
 
139 
inevitable, immediate and deadly threat to their existence. Other threats, 
such as the public finances crisis or public dissatisfaction, are perceived 
as less dangerous and not immediate or fatal (Jarząbek 2016).  
Deepening rivalry  
Theoretically, all the Gulf states are in a similar situation, with their 
high or very high level of dependence on hydrocarbon exports. This 
supposed to facilitate their cooperation as all of them should have an 
interest in maintaining relatively high oil and natural gas prices. There is, 
however, a number of other factors that influence their mutual relations, 
which include durable patterns of amity and enmity as well as numerous 
current political issues. In many cases, they overshadow the purely 
economic interests of the states. As a result, the countries are willing to 
sacrifice their financial profits in exchange for achieving political goals 
and a chance to gain a strategic advantage.  
Even among the GCC member states, the chances for a higher level 
of integration and closer cooperation are hindered by sovereignty 
concerns and internal rivalries. It seemed probable that the organization 
bound together by a shared interest of its members on the one hand but 
torn by discords and divisions on the other will function in the same way 
over the next decades (Martini et al. 2016: 5-58). The crisis in the 
relations between Qatar and Saudi Arabia, which escalated in June 2017, 
shows that these calculations may already be out of date. Saudi Arabia 
attempts to pressure the smaller GCC states to adopt its strict anti-Iranian 
position. While Bahrain and UAE stay in line with Saudi position, 
Kuwait and Oman remained hesitant and "see their future interests best 
served by hedging their bets on both the kingdom and the Islamic 
Republic" (Cafiero and Karasik 2017). For some time the developing 
contacts between Oman and Kuwait with Iran caused the Saudi 
dissatisfaction, but Qatari's explicit opposition to demands of cessation 
of cooperation with Tehran provoked outrage. For now, it is manifested 
in the form of political and economic sanctions and attempts to isolate 
Qatar on the regional level, but a further escalation of the dispute may 
lead to a situation in which Saudi Arabia and the UAE will be willing to 
use force against the disobedient emirate.  
Meanwhile, as experience from the past indicates, in favorable 
conditions the Gulf states are both willing and able to peacefully resolve 
conflicts and de-escalate tensions. What is more, the patterns of amity 
and enmity do not necessarily play a decisive role in the conflict 
resolution between the Gulf states, as in the past both naturally friendly 
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and naturally unfriendly states were able to settle disputes. For example, 
the dispute between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait on oil deposits in the so-
called neutral zone between the two countries, although it has been going 
on since 1922, has never led to a serious political conflict. Both sides 
have an interest in oil production from two shared neutral zone oil fields, 
the offshore Khafji field, and the onshore Wafra field, and despite the 
temporary difficulties, they managed to divide the deposits (Elass 2016). 
Qatar was able to settle its border disputes with both the brotherly Arab 
states, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain in 2001 (Saudi and Qatar End...) as 
well as with Iran, peacefully dividing their respective continental shelves 
in the Gulf in 1970 (Limits in the Seas...). No territorial disputes exist 
between two major rivaling powers of the Gulf, Iran and Saudi Arabia. 
Thus the perennial tensions between the countries of the Gulf are not so 
much the result of objectively conflicting interests but rather the result of a 
specific perception of threats. Saudi crusade against Iran results from their 
overwhelming fear of being encircled by Shiite forces favoring Iran. Recent 
events, especially seizure of power by Shiites in Iraq and the rebellion of 
Houthis in Yemen, in conjunction with the activity of Iranian intelligence 
services among Shiites living in the eastern part of the Arabian peninsula, 
are securitized by Saudi Arabia as an immediate, existential threat. 
Similarly, Iran perceives activities of Saudi Arabia and UAE, particularly 
their enormous military expenditures, attempts to isolate Iran regionally and 
internationally and military actions against Iran's allies in the region as an 
existential threat to its own existence. This further deepens the security 
dilemma and accelerates the regional arms race. 
 
 
Figure 1. How hydrocarbons export dependence deepens security dilemma in the Gulf 
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In these circumstances, the dependence of the subregion's states on 
hydrocarbons export becomes a vulnerability that deepens their own 
sense of danger and contributes to further increasing mutual distrust. The 
crude oil and natural gas production quantities and desired price are 
based not only on the economic calculation but become politicized and 
in certain situations also securitized. Various levels of dependence on 
hydrocarbons export and break-even prices different for each country 
allow using this leverage. This petrifies their economic models of 
distributive economies and hinders efforts to become independent of 
hydrocarbons exports. The capital-surplus oil and gas exporters (GCC 
member states) use their sizeable rents on generous welfare high 
government consumption, which stabilized their autocracies but also 
generated labor market distortions, patronage-driven private sectors, and 
a high dependence on resource rents. The capital-deficient economies (with 
relatively modest resource rents per capita like Iran and Iraq) tried but 
largely failed to deploy rent to create competitive industrial strength. They 
also created systematic welfare entitlements, which combined with 
manipulation of the economy led to rent-seeking, unproductive investment, 
weak private sectors and greater resistance to reform (Malik 2017: 45). 
Conclusions 
In the Gulf subregion, common economic interests do not lead to 
a transformation of the subcomplex into a security regime, not to mention 
the possibility of developing there a security community. On the contrary, 
the export of hydrocarbons becomes yet another factor contributing to 
increasing mutual distrust and rising tensions. Region's states are reluctant to 
undertake any steps to reduce the security dilemma and mitigate the tensions 
among them. This reluctance is further increased by the influence of external 
forces e.g. the support and security guarantees of the United States to the 
GCC member states and Russian support to Iran. With the powerful 
protector behind them, the states are more willing to take offensive actions 
and risky decisions, thus approaching or balancing on the threshold of war.  
Not only the objective conflicting interests but also the specific 
perception of own strengths and vulnerabilities on both the regional and 
state level petrifies the inefficient model of the distributive economy in the 
Gulf countries. This exacerbates competition and disputes as the states 
perceive each other as rivals and enemies rather than friends. It makes 
cooperation between countries, between which there are persistent patterns 
of enmity impossible, and where there are traditional patterns of amity, 
difficult. This inability to cooperate and coordinate sustains diversification 
of interests, which in turn encourages the political usage of economic tools.  
JOANNA DYDUCH, JAROSŁAW JARZĄBEK, ARTUR SKOREK  
 
142 
References 
Al Kharusi S., Stella Ada M. 2018, External Debt and Economic Growth: The Case of 
Emerging Economy, "Journal of Economic Integration" 33(1). 
Al Khatteeb L. 2018, Struggling with low oil prices: from bad to worse in crisis-torn 
Iraq [w:] The Political and Economic Challenges of Energy in the Middle East and 
North Africa, red. D. R. Jalilvand and K. Westphal, London. 
Askari H. and Arfaa N. 2007, Social Safety Net in Islam: The Case of Persian Gulf Oil 
Exporters, "British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies”, 34(2) 
Bahrain, Oman cut gas subsidies as oil hits 12-year low, Al-Jazeera, http://america. 
aljazeera.com/articles/2016/1/12/bahrain-oman-cut-gas-subsidies-as-oil-hits-12-
year-low.html (18.05.2018). 
Buzan, B., Wæver O. 2003, Regions and Powers: The Structure of International 
Security, Cambridge. 
Cafiero G. and Karasik T. 2017, Kuwait, Oman, and the Qatar Crisis, Middle East Institute, 
http://www.mei.edu/content/article/kuwait-oman-and-qatar-crisis (28.05.2018). 
Coogle A. 2017, Saudi Arabia’s ‘War on Terror’ Is Now Targeting Saudi Shiites, 
"Foreign Policy", https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/08/23/saudi-arabias-war-on-
terror-is-now-targeting-saudi-shia/ (04.12.2018). 
Cordesman A., Al-Rodhan K. 2007, Gulf Military Forces in an Era of Asymmetric Wars, 
Washington. 
Economic Diversification in Oil Exporting Arab Countries, IMF, April 2016, 
https://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2016/042916.pdf (18.05.2018). 
El Katiri L. 2016, Saudi Arabia’s Labor Market Challenge, "Harvard Bussines Review", 
https://hbr.org/2016/07/saudi-arabias-labor-market-challenge (4.12.2018). 
El Katiri L. 2018, Oil and resilience: changing energy dynamics and the smaller Gulf 
states [w:] The Political and Economic Challenges of Energy in the Middle East 
and North Africa, red. D. R. Jalilvand and K. Westphal, London. 
Elass J. 2016, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia agree to restart neutral zone oil production, 
"The Arab Weekly", https://thearabweekly.com/kuwait-and-saudi-arabia-agree-
restart-neutral-zone-oil-production (29.05.2018). 
Eltejaei E. 2015, Oil, government's budget and economic growth in Iran, "International 
Journal of Economic Policy in Emerging Economies", 8(3) 
Feierstein G. 2018, What Happens When Yemen Collapses?, "The National Interest", 
http://nationalinterest.org/feature/what-happens-when-yemen-collapses-24774 
(18.05.2018). 
Geiger J. 2018, Saudi Arabia, UAE Assuage Oil Supply Fears, https://oilprice.com/ 
Latest-Energy-News/World-News/Saudi-Arabia-UAE-Assuage-Oil-Supply-Fea 
rs.html (18.05.2018). 
Hanau Santini R. 2017, A New Regional Cold War in the Middle East and North Africa: 
Regional Security Complex Theory Revisited, "The International Spectator" 52(4), 
DOI: 10.1080/03932729.2017.1371487. 
How US drillers weathered OPEC's new oil order, CNBC, http://www.cnbc.com/2015/ 
12/01/how-us-drillers-weathered-opecs-new-oil-order.html (18.05.2018). 
Hvidt M. 2015, The State and the Knowledge Economy in the Gulf: Structural and 
Motivational Challenges, "Muslim World", 105 (1). 
Iran oil min says Tehran prefers "reasonable" oil price, "Reuters", https://uk.reuters. 
com/article/oil-opec-iran/iran-oil-min-says-tehran-prefers-reasonable-oil-price-
shana-idUKD5N1PO00H (25.05.2018). 
The dependence of gulf countries on hydrocarbons export...  
 
143 
Jalilvand D. R. 2018, Iranian energy between nuclear deal, oil price decline and new US 
administration [w:] The Political and Economic Challenges of Energy in the Middle 
East and North Africa, red. D. R. Jalilvand and K. Westphal, London. 
Jarząbek J. 2016, G.C.C. Military Spending in Era of Low Oil Prices, MEI Policy Focus 
2016-19,https://www.mei.edu/sites/default/files/publications/PF19_Jarzabek_GCC 
military_web.pdf (25.05.2018). 
Kuwait facts and figures, OPEC, http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/165.htm 
(18.05.2018). 
Limits in the Seas No. 25. Continental Shelve Boundary: Iran-Qatar, July 9, 1970, 
https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/61564.pdf (29.05.2018). 
Malik A. 2017, Rethinking the Rentier Curse, (in:) Combining Economic and Political 
Development. The Experience of MENA, ed. Giacomo Luciani, Leiden. 
Martini J. et al. 2016, The Outlook for Arab Gulf Cooperation, RAND Corporation. 
Noel P. 2018, A large oil and gas discovery in Bahrain, IISS, https://www. 
iiss.org/en/politics%20and%20strategy/blogsections/2018-4cda/april-600c/a-large-
oil-and-gas-discovery-in-bahrain-3fca (18.05.2018). 
Oct 2017 MCD REO Statistical Appendix - IMF, https://www.imf.org/.../reo-stat-
appendix-tables-with-front-matter (25.05.2018). 
Saudi and Qatar End 35-Year Border Dispute, Sign Accord, "Al Bawaba News", 
https://www.albawaba.com/news/saudi-and-qatar-end-35-year-border-dispute-sign-
accord (29.05.2018). 
Saudi Arabia facts and figures, OPEC, http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/ 
169.htm (18.05.2018). 
Saudi Arabia to run out of cash in less than 5 years, CNN, http://money.cnn.com/ 
2015/10/25/investing/oil-prices-saudi-arabia-cash-opec-middle-east/index.html? 
iid=EL (23.05.2018). 
Saudi Arabia, CIA Factobook 2018, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/sa.html (4.12.2018). 
Shihabi A. 2018, The Iranian Threat: The Saudi Perspective, LSE Middle East Centre 
Blog, http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mec/2018/06/15/the-iranian-threat-the-saudi-perspe 
ctive/ (4.12.2018). 
SIPRI Military Expenditure Database 2018, https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex 
(25.05.2018). 
Sons S. 2018, In dire need of a new social contract: Saudi Arabia's socioeconomic and 
political challenges [w:] The Political and Economic Challenges of Energy in the 
Middle East and North Africa, red. D. R. Jalilvand and K. Westphal, London. 
The JCPOA Timeline, Center for Strategic and International Studies, http://jcpoa 
timeline.csis.org (18.05.2018). 
The Military Balance 2017, International Institute for Strategic Studies. 
Vision 2030, http://vision2030.gov.sa/en (18.05.2018). 
Why the Oil Price is Falling, The Economist, http://www.economist.com/blogs/eco 
nomist-explains/2014/12/economist-explains-4 (18.05.2018). 
World Energy Outlook – Executive Summary, IEA, https://www.iea.org/Textbase 
/.../WEO2015SUM.pdf (18.05.2018). 
 
 
 
Data przekazania tekstu: 19.06.2018 r.; data zaakceptowania tekstu: 5.12.2018 r.
